The McEliece public-key encryption scheme has become an interesting alternative to cryptosystems based on numbertheoretical problems. Different from RSA and ElGamal, McEliece PKC is not known to be broken by a quantum computer. Moreover, even though McEliece PKC has a relatively big key size, encryption and decryption operations are rather efficient. In spite of all the recent results in coding-theory-based cryptosystems, to the date, there are no constructions secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model-the de facto security notion for public-key cryptosystems. In this paper, we show the first construction of a McEliece-based public-key cryptosystem secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model. Our construction is inspired by a recently proposed technique by Rosen and Segev. Index Terms-CCA2 security, McEliece assumptions, public-key encryption, standard model.
I. INTRODUCTION
I NDISTINGUISHABILITY of messages under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks is one of the strongest known notions of security for public-key encryption schemes (PKEs). Many computational assumptions have been used in the literature for obtaining cryptosystems meeting such a strong security notion. Given one-way trapdoor permutations, we know how to obtain CCA2 security from any semantically secure public-key cryptosystem [23] , [27] , [34] . Efficient constructions are also known based on number-theoretic assumptions [9] or on identity-based encryption schemes [6] . Obtaining a CCA2 secure cryptosystem (even an inefficient one) based on the McEliece assumptions in the standard model has been an open problem in this area for quite a while. We note, however, that secure schemes in the random oracle model have been proposed in [19] .
Manuscript received June 27, 2011; revised January 30, 2012 and May 03, 2012; accepted May 13, 2012 . Date of publication June 08, 2012; date of current version September 11, 2012 . This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant CCF-0915675 and in part by a Focht-Powell fellowship. The material in this paper was presented in the Proceedings of CT- RSA, 2009 Recently, Rosen and Segev proposed an elegant and simple new computational assumption for obtaining CCA2 secure PKEs: correlated products [33] . They provided constructions of correlated products based on the existence of certain lossy trapdoor functions [29] which in turn can be based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem and on Paillier's decisional residuosity problem [29] .
In this paper, we show that ideas similar to those of Rosen and Segev can be applied for obtaining an efficient construction of a CCA2 secure PKE built upon the McEliece assumption. Inspired by the definition of correlated products [33] , we define a new kind of PKE called -repetition CPA secure cryptosystem and provide an adaptation of the construction proposed in [33] to this new scenario. Such cryptosystems can be constructed from very weak (one-way CPA secure) PKEs and randomized encoding functions. In contrast, Rosen and Segev give a more general, however less efficient, construction of correlated secure trapdoor functions from lossy trapdoor functions. We show directly that a randomized version of the McEliece cryptosystem [28] is -repetition CPA secure and obtain a CCA2 secure scheme in the standard model. The resulting cryptosystem encrypts many bits as opposed to the single-bit PKE obtained in [33] . We expand the public and secret keys and the ciphertext by a factor of when compared to the original McEliece PKE.
In a concurrent and independent work [16] , Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan proposed a new CCA2 secure PKE based on lattices using the construction by Rosen and Segev. Their scheme assumed that the problem of learning with errors is hard [32] .
A direct construction of correlated products based on McEliece and Niederreiter PKEs has been obtained by Persichetti [30] in a subsequent work.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
If is a string, then denotes its length, while represents the cardinality of a set . If , then denotes the string of ones. denotes the operation of choosing an element of a set uniformly at random. represents the act of running the algorithm with inputs and producing output . We write for representing an algorithm having access to an oracle . We denote by the probability that the event occurs. If and are two strings of bits or two matrices, we denote by their concatenation. The transpose of a matrix is . If and are two strings of bits, we denote by their dot product modulo 2 and by their bitwise XOR. is an oracle that returns an uniformly random element of . We use the notion of randomized encoding function for functions that take an input and random coins and output a randomized representation from which can be recovered using a decoding function . We will use such randomized encoding functions to make messages entropic or unguessable.
B. PKEs
A is defined as follows:
is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter and outputs a public key and a secret key . The public key specifies the message space and the ciphertext space .
2)
is a (possibly) PPT encryption algorithm which receives as input a public key , a message and random coins , and outputs a ciphertext . We write to indicate explicitly that the random coins are used and if fresh random coins are used.
3)
is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret key and a ciphertext , and outputs either a message or an error symbol . 4) (Completeness) For any pair of public and secret keys generated by and any message it holds that with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by and the random coins used by . A basic security notion for PKEs is One-Wayness under chosen-plaintext attacks (OW-CPA). This notion states that every PPT-adversary , given a public key and a ciphertext of a uniformly chosen message , has only negligible probability of recovering the message (The probability runs over the random coins used to generate the public and secret keys, the choice of and the coins of ).
Below we define the standard security notions for PKE, namely, indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) [15] and against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [31] . Our game definition follows the approach of [17] .
Definition 2: (IND-CPA Security):
To a two-stage adversary against , we associate the following experiment:
We define the advantage of in the experiment as We say that is indistinguishable against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) if for all PPT adversaries the advantage of in the above experiment is a negligible function of .
Definition 3: (IND-CCA2 Security):
To a two-stage adversary against we associate the following experiment:
The adversary is not allowed to query with . We define the advantage of in the experiment as
We say that is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) if for all PPT adversaries that make a polynomial number of oracle queries the advantage of in the experiment is a negligible function of .
C. McEliece Cryptosystem
In this section, we define the basic McEliece cryptosystem [25] , following [36] and [28] . Let be a family of binary linear error-correcting codes given by two parameters and . Each code has code length and minimum distance greater than . We further assume that there exists an efficient probabilistic algorithm that samples a code represented by a generator matrix of dimensions together with an efficient decoding procedure that can correct up to errors.
The McEliece PKE consists of a triplet of probabilistic algorithms such that: 1) The PPT key generation algorithm , computes , sets and and outputs .
2) The PPT encryption algorithm , takes the public key and a plaintext as input and outputs a ciphertext , where is a random vector of Hamming weight .
3) The deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm , takes the secret key and a ciphertext , computes and outputs . This basic variant of the McEliece cryptosystem is OW-CPA secure (for a proof, see [36, Proposition 3.1]), given that matrices generated by are pseudorandom (Assumption 4 below) and decoding random linear codes is hard when the noise vector has hamming weight . There exist several optimization for the basic scheme, mainly improving the size of the public key. Biswas and Sendrier [5] show that the public generator matrix can be reduced to row echelon form, reducing the size of the public key from to bits. However, we cannot adopt this optimization into our scheme of Section IV, 1 as it implies a simple attack compromising IND-CPA security 2 (whereas [5] prove OW-CPA security).
In this study, we use a slightly modified version of the basic McEliece PKE scheme. Instead of sampling an error vector by choosing it randomly from the set of vectors with Hamming weight , we generate by choosing each of its bits according to the Bernoulli distribution with parameter for some . Clearly, a simple argument based on the Chernoff bound gives us that the resulting error vector should be within the error capabilities of the code but for a negligible probability in . The reason for using this error distribution is that one of our proofs utilizes the fact that the concatenation of two Bernoulli-distributed vectors and is again Bernoulli distributed. Clearly, it is not the case that is a uniformly chosen vector of Hamming weight if each and are uniformly chosen with Hamming weight .
Using the Bernoulli error distribution, we base the security of our scheme on the pseudorandomness of the McEliece matrices and the pseudorandomness of the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem (see below).
D. McEliece Assumptions and Attacks
In this section, we discuss the hardness assumptions for the McEliece cryptosystem. Let be a family of codes together with a generation-algorithm as above and let be the corresponding generator matrices. An adversary can attack the McEliece cryptosystem in two ways: either he can try to discover the underlying structure which would allow him to decode efficiently or he can try to run a generic decoding algorithm. This high-level intuition that there are two different ways of attacking the cryptosystem can be formalized [36] . Accordingly, the security of the cryptosystem is based on two security assumptions.
The first assumption states that for certain families , the distribution of generator matrices output by is pseudorandom. Let be the dimension of the codes in . Assumption 4: Let be distributed by and be distributed by . For every PPT algorithm , it holds that
In the classical instantiation of the McEliece cryptosystem, is chosen to be the family of irreducible binary Goppacodes of length and dimension . For this instantiation, an efficient distinguisher was built for the case of high-rate codes [12] , [13] (i.e., codes where the rate are very close to 1). But, for codes that do not have a high rate, no generalization of the previous distinguisher is known and the best known attacks [8] , [24] are based on the support splitting algorithm [35] and have exponential runtime. Therefore, one should 1 Neither is it possible for the scheme of [28] , on which our -repetition McEliece scheme is based upon. 2 The scheme of [28] encrypts by computing . If is in row-echelon form, is a prefix of , where is a prefix of . Thus an IND-CPA adversary can distinguish between the encryptions of two plaintexts and by checking whether the prefix of is closer to or .
be careful when choosing the parameters of the Goppa codes, but for encryption schemes it is possible to use codes that do not have high rate.
The second security assumption is the difficulty of the decoding problem (a classical problem in coding theory), or equivalently, the difficulty of the LPN problem (a classical problem in learning theory). The best known algorithms for decoding a random linear code are based on the information set decoding technique [21] , [22] , [37] . Over the years, there have been improvements in the running time [1] , [3] , [4] , [7] , [14] , [26] , but the best algorithms still run in exponential time.
Below we give the definition of LPN problem following the description of [28] .
Definition 5 (LPN Search Problem):
Let be a random binary string of length . We consider the Bernoulli distribution with parameter . Let be the following distribution:
For an adversary trying to discover the random string , we define its advantage as
The problem with parameter is hard if the advantage of all PPT adversaries that make a polynomial number of oracle queries is negligible.
Katz and Shin [18] introduce a distinguishing variant of the -problem, which is more useful in the context of encryption schemes. The with parameter is hard if the advantage of all PPT adversaries is negligible.
Further, Katz and Shin [18] show that the -distinguishing problem is as hard as the search-problem with similar parameters.
Lemma 1 [18] : Say there exists an algorithm making oracle queries, running in time , and such that Then, there exists an adversary making oracle queries, running in time , and such that
The reader should be aware that in the current state of the art, the average case hardness of these two assumptions, as well as all other assumptions used in public-key cryptography, cannot be reduced to the worst-case hardness of a NP-hard problem 3 (and even if that was the case, we do not even know if ). The confidence on the hardness of solving all these problems on average case (that is what cryptography really needs) comes from the lack of efficient solutions despite the efforts of the scientific community over the years. But more studies are, of course, necessary in order to better assess the difficulties of such problems. We should highlight that when compared to cryptosystems based on number-theoretical assumptions such as the hardness of factoring or of computing the discrete log, the cryptosystems based on coding and lattice assumptions have the advantage that no efficient quantum algorithm breaking the assumptions is known. One should also be careful when implementing the McEliece cryptosystem as to avoid side-channel attacks [38] .
E. Signature Schemes
Now we define signature schemes and the security notion called one-time strong unforgeability.
Definition 7: (Signature Scheme):
A signature scheme is a triplet of algorithms such that: 1)
is a PPT key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter and outputs a verification key and a signing key . The verification key specifies the message space and the signature space .
2)
is a (possibly) PPT signing algorithm which receives as input a signing key and a message , and outputs a signature .
3)
is a deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm which takes as input a verification key , a message and a signature , and outputs a bit indicating whether is a valid signature for or not (i.e., the algorithm outputs 1 if it is a valid signature and outputs 0 otherwise). 4) (Completeness) For any pair of signing and verification keys generated by and any message , it holds that with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by and .
Definition 8 (One-Time Strong Unforgeability):
To a twostage adversary against , we associate the following experiment:
We say that a signature scheme is one-time strongly unforgeable if for all PPT adversaries the probability that outputs 1 is a negligible function of . Table of McEliece key parameters and security estimates taken from [36] .
One-way functions are sufficient to construct existentially unforgeable one-time signature schemes [20] , [27] .
III. -REPETITION PKE
A. Definitions
We now define a -repetition public-key encryption.
Definition 9: ( -Repetition Public-Key Encryption): For a , , and a randomized encoding function with a decoding function , we define the -repetition public-key encryption scheme as the triplet of algorithms , , such that: 1)
is a PPT key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter and calls 's key generation algorithm times obtaining the public keys and the secret keys . sets the public key as and the secret key as .
2)
is a PPT encryption algorithm which receives as input a public key , a message and coins and , and outputs a ciphertext .
3)
is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret key and a ciphertext . It outputs a message if are all equal to some . Otherwise, it outputs an error symbol . 4) (Completeness) For any pairs of public and secret keys generated by and any message , it holds that with overwhelming probability over the random coins used by and . We also define security properties that the used in the next sections should meet. . Thus, we may only require that is OW-CPA secure.
B. IND-CCA2 Security From Verifiable IND-CPA Secure -Repetition PKE
In this section, we construct the IND-CCA2 secure public-key encryption scheme and prove its security. We assume the existence of an one-time strongly unforgeable signature scheme and of a that is secure and verifiable under uniform -repetition. We use the following notation for derived keys: For a public key and a -bit string we write . We will use the same notation for secret keys .
1) Key Generation: is a PPT key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter . calls 's key generation algorithm times to obtain public keys and secret keys . It sets , and outputs 2) Encryption:
is a PPT encryption algorithm which receives as input the public key and a message and proceeds as follows: 1) executes the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme obtaining a signing key and a verification key ; 2) compute , where are random coins; 3) computes the signature ; 4) outputs the ciphertext .
3) Decryption:
is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret key and a ciphertext and proceeds as follows: 1) if , it outputs and halts; 2) it computes and outputs . Note that if is an invalid ciphertext (i.e., not all decrypt to the same plaintext), then outputs as outputs .
As in [33] , we can apply a universal one-way hash function to the verification keys (as in [10] ) and use for a constant . Note that the hash function in question need not be modeled as a random oracle. For ease of presentation, we do not apply this method in our scheme description.
Theorem 1:
Given that is an one-time strongly unforgeable signature scheme and that is IND-CPA secure and verifiable under uniform -repetition, the public-key encryption scheme is IND-CCA2 secure. Proof: In this proof, we closely follow [33] . Denote by the IND-CCA2 adversary. Consider the following sequence of games.
Game 1: This is the IND-CCA2 game. Game 2: Same as game 1, except that the signature keys that are used for the challenge-ciphertext are generated before the interaction with starts. Further, game 2 always outputs if sends a decryption query with . We will now establish the remaining steps in two lemmata.
Lemma 2: It holds that , given that is an one-time strongly unforgeable signature scheme.
Proof: Given that does not send a valid decryption query with and , 's views in game 1 and game 2 are identical. Thus, in order to distinguish game 1 and game 2 must send a valid decryption query with and . We will use to construct an adversary against the one-time strong unforgeability of the signature scheme . basically simulates the interaction of game 2 with , however, instead of generating itself, it uses the obtained from the one-time strong unforgeability experiment. Furthermore, generates the signature for the challenge-ciphertext by using its signing oracle provided by the one-time strong unforgeability game. Whenever sends a valid decryption query with and , terminates and outputs . Obviously, 's output is identically distributed in Game 2 and 's simulation. Therefore, if distinguishes between game 1 and game 2 with nonnegligible advantage , then 's probability of forging a signature is also , thus breaking the one-time strong unforgeability of .
Lemma 3:
It holds that is negligible in the security parameter, given that is verifiable and IND-CPA secure under uniform k-repetition.
Proof: Assume that for some non-negligible . We will now construct an IND-CPA adversary against that breaks the IND-CPA security of with advantage . Instead of generating like game 2, proceeds as follows. Let be the public key provided by the IND-CPA experiment to . first generates a pair of keys for the signature scheme . Then, the public key is formed by setting . All remaining components of are generated by , for which stores the corresponding . Clearly, the generated by is identically distributed to the generated by game 2, as the -algorithm of generates the components of independently. Now, whenever sends a decryption query , where (decryption queries with are not answered by game 2), picks an index with and checks if , if not it outputs . Otherwise, it computes . Verifiability guarantees that it holds that , i.e., the output is identically distributed as in game 2. When sends the challenge messages , , forwards , to the IND-CPA experiments and receives a challenge-ciphertext . then computes and sends to . This is identically distributed as in game 2. Once produces output, outputs whatever outputs. Putting it all together, 's views are identically distributed in game 2 and in the simulation of . Therefore it holds that . Thus breaks the IND-CPA security of with nonnegligible advantage , contradicting the assumption.
Plugging Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 together immediately establishes that any PPT IND-CCA2 adversary has at most negligible advantage in winning the IND-CCA2 experiment for the scheme .
IV. VERIFIABLE -REPETITION MCELIECE SCHEME
In this section, we will instantiate a verifiable -repetition encryption scheme based on the McEliece cryptosystem.
In [28] , it was proved that the cryptosystem obtained by changing the encryption algorithm of the McEliece cryptosystem to encrypt (where is random padding) instead of just encrypting the message (the so called Randomized McEliece cryptosystem) is IND-CPA secure, if is chosen sufficiently large for the LPNDP to be hard (e.g., linear in the security parameter ). We will, therefore, use the randomized encoding function (with ) in our verifiable -repetition McEliece scheme. As basis scheme for our verifiable -repetition McEliece scheme, we use the OW-CPA secure textbook McEliece with a Bernoulli error distribution.
The verification algorithm works as follows. Given a secret key from the secret-key vector , it first decrypts the th component of by . Then, for all , it checks whether the vectors have a Hamming weight smaller than , where is the generator matrix given in . If so, outputs 1, otherwise 0. Clearly, if accepts, then all ciphertexts are close enough to the respective codewords , i.e., invoking would also output . Therefore, we have that , if and only if for some .
A. Security of the -Repetition Randomized McEliece
We now prove that the modified Randomized McEliece is IND-CPA secure under -repetition.
By the completeness of each instance, the probability that in one instance a correctly generated ciphertext is incorrectly decoded is negligible. Since is polynomial, it follows by the union bound that the probability that a correctly generated ciphertext of is incorrectly decoded is also negligible. So meets the completeness requirement. Denote by random matrices of size , by the public-key matrices of the McEliece cryptosystem and by the error vectors. Define and . Let and be the and sub-matrices of such that . Define and similarly.
Lemma 4:
The scheme is IND-CPA secure, given that both the McEliece assumption and the LPNDP assumption hold.
Proof: Let be an IND-CPA adversary against . Consider the following three games.
Game 1: This is the IND-CPA game. Game 2: Same as game 1, except that the components of the public key are computed by instead of , where is a randomly chosen matrix of the same size as Game 3: Same as game 2, except that the components of the challenge-ciphertext are not computed by but rather chosen uniformly at random. Indistinguishability of game 1 and game 2 follows by a simple hybrid argument using the McEliece assumption, we omit this for the sake of brevity. The indistinguishability of game 2 and game 3 can be established as follows. First observe that it holds that for . Setting , and , we can write . Now, the LPNDP assumption allows us to substitute with a uniformly random distributed vector , as and are uniformly distributed and is Bernoulli distributed. Therefore is also uniformly distributed. Thus, we have reached game 3. 's advantage in game 3 is obviously 0, as the challenge-ciphertext is statistically independent of the challenge bit . This concludes the proof.
V. GENERALIZED SCHEME As in [33] , it is possible to generalize the scheme to encrypt correlated messages instead of encrypting times the same message . In this section, we show that a similar approach is possible for our scheme, yielding an IND-CCA2 secure McEliece variant that has asymptotically the same ciphertext expansion as the efficient IND-CPA scheme of [19] . We now present a generalized version of our encryption scheme using a correlated plaintext space.
A. Definitions Definition 12: ( -Correlated Messages):
We call a tuple of messages -correlated for some constant and , if given any messages of tuple it is possible to efficiently recover all the messages. We denote the space of such messages tuples by . Basically, -correlated messages can be erasure-corrected. Now we define a correlated PKE.
Definition 13: (Correlated Public-Key Encryption): For a
, , and a randomized encoding function that maps from the plaintext-space to the correlated plaintext-space (with corresponding decoding function ), we define the correlated public-key encryption scheme as the triplet of algorithms , , such that: 1)
2)
is a PPT encryption algorithm which receives as input a public key and a message . The algorithm computes (with fresh random coins ) and outputs the ciphertext .
3)
is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret key and a ciphertext . It first computes a tuple , outputs if , if not it outputs an error symbol .
4) (Completeness) For any
pairs of public and secret keys generated by and any message , it holds that with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by and .
We also define security properties that the correlated PKE used in the next sections should meet.
Definition 14: (Security of Correlated Public-Key Encryption):
We say that (built from an encryption scheme ) is secure if is IND-CPA secure.
Definition 15: ( -Verification):
We say that is -verifiable if the exists a efficient deterministic algorithm , such that given a ciphertext , the public key and any distinct secret keys (with ), it holds that if then for some (i.e., decrypts to a valid plaintext).
B. IND-CCA2 Security From IND-CPA Secure Correlated PKE
We now describe the IND-CCA2 secure public-key encryption scheme built using the correlated PKE and prove its security. We assume the existence of a correlated PKE, , that is secure and -verifiable. We also use an error correcting code with minimum distance and polynomial-time encoding. Finally, we assume the existence of an one-time strongly unforgeable signature scheme in which the verification keys are elements of (we assumed that the verification keys are elements of only for simplicity, we can use any signature scheme if there is a injective mapping from the set of verification keys to ). We will use the following notation: For a codeword , set . Analogously for .
1) Key Generation: is a PPT key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter . proceeds as follows. It calls 's key generation algorithm times obtaining the public keys and the secret keys . Outputs and .
2) Encryption:
is a PPT encryption algorithm which receives as input the public key and a message and proceeds as follows: 1) executes the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme obtaining a signing key and a verification key . Computes . Let denote the -element of ; 2) computes ; 3) computes the signature ; 4) outputs the ciphertext .
3) Decryption: is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret key and a ciphertext and proceeds as follows: 1) if , it outputs and halts. Otherwise, it performs the following steps; 2) compute ; 3) compute and output .
Theorem 2: Given that is an one-time strongly unforgeable signature scheme and that is secure and -verifiable, the public-key encryption scheme is IND-CCA2 secure.
Proof: The proof is almost identical to the proof of theorem 1. Denote by the IND-CCA2 adversary. Consider the following two of games.
Game 1: This is the IND-CCA2 game. Game 2: Same as game 1, except that the signature keys that are used for the challenge-ciphertext are generated before the interaction with starts. Further, game 2 terminates and outputs if sends a decryption query with with . Again, we will split the proof of Theorem 2 in two lemmata.
Lemma 5: From 's view, game 1 and game 2 are computationally indistinguishable, given that is an existentially unforgeable one-time signature scheme.
We omit the proof, since it is identical to the proof of lemma 2.
Lemma 6: It holds that is negligible in the security parameter, given that is verifiable IND-CPA secure correlated PKE.
Proof: We proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3. Assume that for some nonnegligible . We will now construct an IND-CPA adversary against that breaks the IND-CPA security of with advantage . Again, instead of generating like game 2, will construct using the public key provided by the IND-CPA experiment. Let . sets . All remaining components of are generated by , for which stores the corresponding . Obviously, the generated by is identically distributed to the generated by game 2, as in both cases all components are are generated independently by the key-generation algorithm of . Whenever sends a decryption query with , does the following. Let and . Since the two codewords and are distinct and the code has minimum distance , there exist a -set of indices such that it holds for all that . Thus, the public keys , for were generated by and it thus knows the corresponding secret keys . checks if holds, i.e., if is a valid ciphertext for under the public key . If so, decrypts . Since the plaintext-space is -correlated, can efficiently recover the whole message from the -submessage . Finally, decodes to recover the message and outputs to . Observe that the verifiability property of holds regardless of the subset used to verify. Thus, from 's view the decryption oracle behaves identically in game 2 and in 's simulation. Finally, when sends its challenge messages and , forwards and to the IND-CPA experiment for and receives a challenge-ciphertext . then computes and outputs the challenge-ciphertext to . When generates an output, outputs whatever outputs.
Putting it all together, 'S views are identically distributed in game 2 and 's simulation. Therefore, it holds that . Thus, breaks the IND-CPA security of with non-negligible advantage , contradicting the assumption.
Plugging Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 establish that any PPT IND-CCA2 adversary has at most negligible advantage in winning the IND-CCA2 experiment for the scheme .
C. Verifiable Correlated PKE Based on the McEliece Scheme
We can use a modified version of the scheme presented in Section IV to instantiate a -correlated verifiable IND-CPA secure McEliece scheme . A corresponding IND-CCA2 secure scheme is immediately implied by the construction in Section V-B. As plaintext-space for , we choose the set of all tuples , where is a -bit string and is a codeword from code that can efficiently correct erasures. Clearly, is -correlated. Let be the encoding function of and the decoding function of . The randomized encoding function used by proceeds as follows. Given a message and random coins , it first computes and outputs . The decoding function takes a tuple and outputs . Like in the scheme of Section IV, the underlying OW-CPA secure encryption scheme is textbook-McEliece. The -correlatedness of follows directly by the construction of , and . It remains to show verifiability and IND-CPA security of the scheme. The -algorithm takes a ciphertext , a public key , an a partial secret key (for a -sized index set ) and proceeds as follows. First, it decrypts the components of at the indices of , i.e., it computes for . Then, it checks whether all are of the form for the same string . If not, it stops and outputs 0. Next, it constructs a vector with for and (erasure) for . then runs the erasure-correction algorithm of on . If the erasure-correction fails, it stops and outputs 0. Otherwise let be the corrected vector returned by the erasure-correction. Then, sets . Let be the generator matrices given in . Finally, checks whether all the vectors , for , have Hamming weight smaller than . If so, it outputs 1, otherwise 0. Clearly, if outputs 1, then the ciphertext-components of are valid McEliece encryptions.
The IND-CPA-security is proven analogously to Lemma 4. First, the McEliece generator matrices are replaced by random matrices , then, using the LPNDP-assumption, vectors of the form are replaced by uniformly random vectors . Likewise, after this transformation the adversarial advantage is 0.
